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Recently a tremendous amount of attention has 
been devoted to North Korea, the summit with the 
U.S. president, and how that might change the 
trajectory of Kim Jong-un regime’s relationship 
with the outside world. We must remember that 
Kim has a range of options in his toolkit for coercive 
diplomacy, beyond the nuclear and missile programs, 
to advance his objectives, as demonstrated by the 
Sony hack in 2014 and the assassination of his half-
brother Kim Jong-nam with a chemical nerve agent. 
Ever since he offered an olive branch to South Korea 
in his 2018 New Year’s speech, Kim Jong-un has 
been engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activities, 
securing summits with regional and world leaders 
within the first half of 2018 that would make any 
leader green with envy. After doubling down on 
isolation for six years as he embarked on an 
ambitious—and successful—effort to advance his 
ballistic missile and nuclear programs, Kim has 
already met the presidents of South Korea and 
China twice, and with the U.S. president in June, 
and possibly the Russian leader in the near future.  
In the past three months, Kim has shown to be a 
remarkably adroit regional player, first by using its 
nuclear weapons program to highlight Pyongyang’s 
strategic relevance and create leverage, and then 
by using engagement to exploit respective national 
priorities and to weaken sanction pressure. Kim has 
been saying the right things to the right people. With 
Xi Jinping, he has revived his father Kim Jong-il’s 
old talking points, expressing admiration for China’s 
economic development, science, and technology, 
reigniting as yet unrequited Chinese desire for 
Pyongyang to open up and reform itself with 
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Beijing’s guidance and mentoring. With Moon Jae-
in, Kim has invoked the possibility of peace on the 
Korean Peninsula, finally ending the conflict through 
a peace mechanism through a Korea-only process. 
With Donald Trump, Kim seems to be appealing 
directly to him, using flattery to satisfy his perceived 
desire to bring peace and a resolution to the North 
Korean nuclear issue once and for all. 
Kim’s use of the hub-and-spokes model of 
engagement suggests that he is seeking to 
reshape regional dynamics on his terms, cementing 
Last fall and winter, the world was tense with the 
real possibilities of a military conflict breaking out 
on the Korean Peninsula as a result of Kim Jong-
un’s testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
the North’s sixth and largest nuclear test, and 
the rhetorical war with U.S. President Donald 
Trump. While the threat of another Korean war 
seems to be in the rear-view mirror, for now, 
we have to remember that Kim has been 
expanding, sharpening, and demonstrating 
other tools of coercive diplomacy, including 
selective engagement, cyberattacks, and 
chemical weapons. He has been deploying 
these tools to suppress criticism of the regime, 
sow division within South Korea and among U.S. 
allies and regional stakeholders, and shape an 
external environment favorable for reinforcing 
Kim’s legitimacy and North Korea’s claimed 
status as a nuclear weapons power.
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his status as a nuclear weapons power and 
strengthening his perceived ability to drive events 
on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang is not a 
“revisionist” power in the same category as China 
and Russia that “want to shape a world consistent 
with their authoritarian mode—gaining veto 
authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, 
and security decisions” according to the 2018 U.S. 
National Defense Strategy. North Korea’s ambitions 
are probably not expansionary, given its focus on 
internal security. Even if it were, North Korea’s 
“rogue” nation status, its crippled economy and 
the weight of sanctions, and its unique political 
ideology, almost certainly will not win any converts 
in the international community or have enough 
power to woo even the weakest states.  
Yet Kim Jong-un has been expanding, sharpening, 
and demonstrating tools for coercive diplomacy. 
The cyberattack on Sony was a sobering moment 
for Washington. In November 2014, Pyongyang 
said that the release of the movie The Interview, 
a comedy depicting a Central Intelligence Agency 
assassination attempt against Kim, would 
constitute an “act of war.” North Korean hackers 
threatened 9/11-type attacks against theaters that 
showed the film. 
Such an attack never happened, but the fear 
was real. When Sony Pictures Entertainment, 
the company responsible for producing the film, 
decided to cancel the theatrical release of the 
movie, President Obama criticized the decision and 
cautioned, “…imagine if producers and distributors 
and others start engaging in self-censorship 
because they don’t want to offend the sensibilities 
of somebody whose sensibilities probably need 
to be offended.” Peter Singer, a top U.S. expert on 
cyber warfare, said, “The problem now is not the 
hack. It’s how Sony responded to it. It’s the cave-
in,” and added, “They rewarded and incentivized 
attacks on the rest of us.” 
North Korean entities threatened Sony employees 
and their families, as well. The regime made it 
clear through a cyberattack that it would not 
tolerate insults to Kim and that the financial 
consequences for the perpetrators would be dire. 
North Korea hackers destroyed the data of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, and dumped confidential 
information, including salary lists, nearly 50,000 
Social Security numbers, and five unreleased films 
onto public file-sharing sites. 
The Sony hack showed that North Korea’s tools 
of coercion go beyond missiles, and that the Kim 
regime has the will and the capacity to punish 
perceived offenses outside their borders. This 
happened again in 2017, when Kim Jong-un 
probably ordered the killing of his half-brother 
Jong-nam in Malaysia through the use of a deadly 
chemical nerve agent. It was a sophisticated 
attack, orchestrated through a ruse involving two 
young women who thought they were acting in a 
reality show. It was no secret that Kim was not a 
fan of Jong-nam, the once favorite of their father, 
Jong Il, and the erstwhile successor. The method 
and location, however, point to Kim’s desire to 
have maximum impact—a humiliating and painful 
way for his half-sibling to die on camera at an 
international airport; those images ricocheted 
around the world. The message was clear. Kim will 
not tolerate any competitors or anyone who spoke 
ill of the regime; Jong-nam had been a vocal critic 
of North Korea and had said that Jong-un’s regime 
would not last when his younger brother assumed 
power in December 2011. 
While the Sony hack and the assassination of Jong-
nam happened during a period of tension between 
North Korea and the international community, 
Kim’s recent spate of summit diplomacy has 
also engendered fear about direct reprisals from 
Pyongyang or that the mood of engagement in Seoul 
might lead to a tamping down on any criticism of the 
Kim regime. When North Korea angrily demanded 
the return of a dozen North Korean waitresses 
who defected to South Korea, the possibility that 
Seoul might acquiesce to preserve the mood of 
engagement sent ripples throughout the defector 
community nervous about being forcibly returned 
to the North. The Moon administration has also 
reportedly prevented some nongovernmental 
organizations from sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets 
to North Korea to avoid offending Kim and losing 
the momentum for inter-Korean reconciliation. At a 
minimum, North Korea is attempting to sow division 
within South Korea and shape Seoul’s policies 
toward ones that are favorable to Pyongyang. 
Ultimately, Kim’s hub-and-spokes model of 
engagement and tools of coercion are intended 
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to intimidate potential critics and manipulate 
the external environment into one that would 
be favorable for the advancement of his goals, 
including buttressing his legitimacy and maintaining 
strategic relevance in the region. While we should 
be focused on the nuclear and ballistic missile 
threat, we should also be vigilant about how Kim 
might seek to erode the mechanisms of democratic 
governance and silence those who seek to put 
pressure on Pyongyang to improve its repressive 
practices and human rights. 
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